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use#LAAPATENT BUYOUTS: A MECHANISM FOR ENCOURAGING
INNOVATION*
MICHAEL KREMER
In 1839 the French government purchased the Daguerreotype patent and
placed it in the public domain. Such patent buyouts could potentially eliminate the
monopoly price distortions and incentives for rent-stealing duplicative research
created by patents, while increasing incentives for original research. Governments
could offer to purchase patents at their estimated private value, as determined in
an auction, times a markup equal to the typical ratio of inventions’ social and
private value. Most patents purchased would be placed in the public domain, but to
induce bidders to reveal their valuations, a few would be sold to the highest bidder.
Economic growth ultimately depends on the production of
new ideas, but competitive markets do not provide appropriate
incentives for the production of ideas. If consumers pay only the
marginal cost of transmitting ideas, revenues will be insufficient
to cover the cost of producing ideas. Historically, societies have
used a wide variety of mechanisms to encourage production of
ideas. Some, such as patents and copyrights, provide inventors
with monopolies over goods produced using their ideas. Others,
such as the National Science Foundation and the synthetic fuels
program, directly subsidize research. The United States uses both
types of mechanisms: for example, government and industry each
spent about $13 billion on health research in 1992 [National
Science Board 1993].
Creating monopolies in ideas and directly subsidizing re-
search both lead to serious problems. Patents and copyrights
create insufficient incentives for original research, since inventors
cannot fully capture consumer surplus or spillovers of their ideas
to other researchers. Patents and copyrights also create static
distortions from monopoly pricing and encourage socially waste-
ful expenditures on reverse engineering to invent around patents.
Under symmetric information and full commitment, the
ﬁrst-best solution to underprovision of ideas is subsidizing re-
search, rather than creating a new set of monopoly price distor-
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research is conducted, the government may not know the costs
and expected beneﬁts of research, and may not even be able to
conceive of some inventions. Allowing government officials wide
discretion to set payments to inventors ex post may lead to
rent-seeking and to expropriation of investors after their research
costs are sunk.
In 1839 the government of France combined elements of the
patent system and of direct government support of research by
purchasing the patent for Daguerreotype photography and plac-
ing the technique in the public domain. After the patent was
bought out, Daguerreotype photography was rapidly adopted
worldwide and was subject to myriad technical improvements.
Such patent buyouts have the potential to eliminate monopoly
price distortions and incentives for wasteful reverse engineering,
while encouraging original research.
A major challenge for any system of patent buyouts is
determining the price. This paper examines a mechanism through
which the private value of patents would be determined using an
auction. The government would offer to buy out patents at this
private value times a ﬁxed markup that would roughly cover the
difference between the social and private values of inventions.
Inventors could decide whether to sell or retain their patents.
Patents purchased by the government would typically be placed in
the public domain. However, in order to provide auction partici-
pants with an incentive to truthfully reveal their valuations, the
government would randomly select a few patents that would be
sold to the highest bidder. Encouraging innovation through such a
mechanism would require more discretion by government officials
than the current patent system, but substantially less discretion
than that exercised by, say, the National Institutes of Health.
As discussed by Dutton [1984] and Shavell and Ypserle
[1998], the relative merits of rewards and patents were widely
debated in the nineteenth century. Macife [1869], a member of the
British Parliament in the nineteenth century, proposed replacing
the patent system with a reward system. In this century Polanvyi
[1943] suggested replacing patents with rewards based on ex post
estimates of the value of inventions. Guell and Fischbaum [1995]
suggest that the government use its power of eminent domain to
purchasepharmaceuticalpatents.Theyproposethatjudgesdeter-
mine the buyout price. One problem with allowing broad adminis-
trative discretion over the patent buyout price is that this may
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tives for innovation. Allowing broad discretion may also lead to
wasteful expenditures on rent-seeking, and if some groups in
society are better able to organize politically than others, this
rent-seeking may distort the pattern of research [Cohen and Noll
1991]. This paper describes how a market mechanism could be
used to determine the value of patents. As a safeguard against
conﬁscation of inventions, patent holders could choose whether to
sell their patents. Patent buyouts would thus supplement, rather
than replace, the existing patent system. Inventors would receive
a markup over the private value of the patents, so as to bring
incentives for invention closer to the social value. This paper also
differs from Guell and Fischbaum in addressing the problem of
creating proper incentives for the development of complementary
and substituting inventions. Shavell and Ypserle [1998] argue
that a system in which inventors could choose between rewards
and patents would be superior to a pure patent system. One
problem with a ﬁxed reward is that people could claim rewards for
trivial inventions. General Motors could stick a useless piece of
metal onto a Chevrolet, and as long as the automobile sold due to
other attractive features, GM could argue it deserved the reward.
More generally, this paper is related to a broader literature on the
potential of various mechanisms to encourage innovation [Johns-
ton and Zeckhauser 1991; Romer 1993; Taylor 1995; Baker 1996;
Lichtman 1997;1 Scotchmer 1997].
The paper is organized as follows. Section I argues that the
distortions associated with both patents and direct government
support of research are severe enough that other methods of
encouraging research should be explored. Section II discusses the
historical experience of patent buyouts. Section III explains how
an auction could be used to estimate the value of patents, and thus
determine the buyout price. Section IV discusses equilibrium
behavior in the auction when inventors have private information
about the value of patents, or are the low-cost producers of the
patented good. Section V discusses incentives for marketing and
development of inventions under patent buyouts. Section VI
1. Lichtman [1997] has suggested that the government subsidize low-
valuation consumers so as to avoid distortions from monopoly pricing through a
form of price discrimination. Note that targeting subsidies to low-valuation
consumers requires that the government have lots of information, and that if the
patent owner had this information, it could price discriminate. Moreover, Licht-
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and complementary patents. Perhaps the chief problem with
patent buyouts is that they are potentially vulnerable to collusion,
since inventors could bribe auction participants to submit high
bids. Section VII discusses several ways the government could
control collusion. Section VIII argues that patent buyouts should
focus on the pharmaceutical industry. It suggests that a limited
trial of patent buyouts could be conducted ﬁrst, perhaps, by a
private foundation. If the buyouts seem successful, the program
could be tried on a larger scale.
I. MECHANISMS FOR ENCOURAGING INNOVATION
This section argues that the distortions associated with
encouraging research through patents and through direct govern-
ment support are sufficiently severe that it is worth investigating
additional mechanisms for encouraging innovation.
I.A. Patents
Encouraging research through patents creates static distor-
tions, underinvestment in research, and distortion of research
toward duplicating existing inventions.
Static distortions arise as people who value the good above
the marginal cost of production do not consume it at the monopoly
price. To take a particularly dramatic example, monopoly pricing
of AZT makes it impossible for HIV-positive pregnant women in
developing countries to prevent transmission to their children,
leading to hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of cases of
pediatric AIDS. To see that ﬁnancing research with monopoly
proﬁts not only is not ﬁrst best, but is generically less efficient
than ﬁnancing research through tax revenue, consider the prob-
lem of a social planner choosing a tax to ﬁnance research. The
principles of Ramsey taxation should clearly guide the planner’s
decision, and it is highly unlikely that the optimal tax will be a
several thousand percent tax on the patented good. Yet ﬁnancing
research by giving monopoly rights to inventors is equivalent to
such a tax.
Patents create far too little incentive for original research,
since potential inventors will not take consumer surplus into
account when deciding whether to undertake research. To take
another dramatic example, Michael Milken would presumably
pay hundreds of millions of dollars for an effective drug to ﬁght
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into account in setting their research budgets, since they will not
be able to extract Milken’s consumer surplus. Under the crude
assumption that willingness to pay for drugs is proportional to
income, calculations using U. S. household income distribution
data from the 1995 CPS suggest that the social value of new
pharmaceuticals is 2.7 times the proﬁts that would be extracted
by a monopolist who could not price discriminate. The deadweight
loss due to monopoly pricing would be one-quarter of the sum of
proﬁts and consumer surplus.2
Another reason patents create insufficient research incen-
tives is that they do not reward researchers for the externalities
they create for other researchers. Theoretically, these externali-
ties could either be positive, through knowledge spillovers, or
negative, through patent races. However, the available empirical
evidence suggests that on balance, researchers usually create
positive externalities for other researchers. Jaffe [1986] ﬁnds that,
controlling for technological opportunities, ﬁrms whose neighbors
invest more in research and development have more patents per
dollar of R&D and a higher return to R&D. Cockburn and
Henderson [1993, 1994] ﬁnd similar results for pharmaceutical
ﬁrms, even after controlling for measures of technical opportunity.
They conclude that, ‘‘far from ‘mining out’ opportunities, competi-
tors’ research appears to be a complementary activity to own
R&D.’’
An extensive empirical literature suggests that social returns
to innovation far exceed the private returns. Nadiri [1993]
summarizes this literature and ﬁnds that social rates of return to
R&D average close to 50 percent. Mansﬁeld et al. [1977] examine
seventeen innovations in detail, and ﬁnd an average social rate of
return of 56 percent, compared with a 25 percent private rate of
return. In his exhaustive study of the CT scanner industry,
Trajtenberg [1990] ﬁnds that the social return to R&D was 270
percent, orders of magnitude above the private return.
The available evidence thus suggests that the social rate of
return on research and development is at least twice the private
rate of return, given the quantities consumed under monopolistic
pricing. The social rate of return would be even greater if
inventions were priced at marginal cost, so that the deadweight
2. Price discrimination may reduce this deadweight loss, but it is unlikely to
allow pharmaceutical companies to capture much of the consumer surplus from
the tail of high-income, high-valuation customers.
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due to monopoly pricing is one-quarter of proﬁts plus consumer
surplus (as would be the case given the U. S. income distribution if
willingness to pay were proportional to income), the social return
to research under marginal cost pricing would be 2 3 5/4 5 2.5
times the private rate of return on research under the current
patent system.
Patents also distort the direction of research by creating too
much incentive to develop substitutes for patented goods and too
little to create complements. By developing substitute inventions,
ﬁrms can steal rents from existing patent holders. The limited
available evidence suggests that this problem may be severe.
Mansﬁeld, Schwartz, and Wagner [1981] ﬁnd that 60 percent of a
sample of patented innovations were imitated within four years,
and that the average imitation cost was two-thirds the original
cost of invention. Potential developers of complementary inven-
tions, on the other hand, will have too little incentive to develop
these inventions if they must sink costs into developing the
complementary inventions before concluding licensing agree-
ments with owners of original patents [Green and Scotchmer
1982]. Sometimes, agreements between owners of complementary
patents are not reached (perhaps because of asymmetric informa-
tion), and inventions remain unused. For example, the develop-
ment of the high pressure steam engine was blocked by Watt’s
patent covering all steam engines; Watt’s steam engine was
blocked by a previous patent until he found a way to invent
around it; and Edison’s improved version of the telegraph was
blocked by Bell’s prior patent for many years [Mokyr 1990].
Since a substantial fraction of research funds are spent on
wasteful duplication of existing products, the social rate of return
to original research is substantially higher than the overall rate of
return to research. Based on Mansﬁeld’s [1981] estimates, a
reasonable guess is that one-quarter of research funds are spent
on socially wasteful duplication and that three-quarters are spent
on original research. In this case, the social return to original
inventions would be 4/3 as large as the average social return to
research, which, as discussed above, may be 2.5 times the private
return. Thus, the social return to original research may be 3.33
times the private return, implying that patents create far too little
incentive for original research. In the analysis below, I will
generally make the conservative assumption that the social value
of patents is on average only twice the private value.
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Since ideas are nonrival, standard public goods arguments
suggest that research should be publicly ﬁnanced. However,
governments’efforts to ﬁnance research are plagued by asymmet-
ric information between researchers and governments. When the
government pays for research input, rather than output, it is
difficult to prevent researchers from shirking, either by applying
little effort or by focusing on areas of purely scientiﬁc interest. The
work of Nadiri [1993], Nadiri and Manuneas [1994], and Bern-
stein and Nadiri [1988, 1991] suggests that the rate of return on
privately ﬁnanced R&D is much higher than that on publicly
ﬁnanced R&D. Lichtenberg [1992] makes the extreme estimate
that the within-country social return to private research and
development is seven times as large as the return to investment in
equipment and structures, but that the social return to govern-
ment-funded research and development is insigniﬁcantly differ-
ent from zero.3
Paying for research output through prizes creates much
stronger incentives for researchers than paying for research
inputs through grants. Prizes were more frequently used in the
past than they are today, and stimulated inventions ranging from
food canning to the chronometer [Wright 1983]. Wright [1983] and
Scotchmer [1997] argue, however, that the potential of prizes is
limited because governments lack information on the beneﬁts (or
even possibility) of many inventions before they have been
invented. This would be less of a problem if governments could
specify prizes ex post, but in this case, the authority awarding
prizes might be tempted to expropriate inventors by offering
inadequate prizes. This may be a problem even for prizes ostensi-
bly speciﬁed ex ante, if the rules governing prize awards are not
clear. Sobel [1995] relates the difficulties the inventor of the
chronometer encountered in claiming the British government’s
£20,000 prize for a method of determining longitude at sea.4
Another problem with direct government support of research
is that small groups who are strongly affected by particular
government decisions may lobby to inﬂuence these decisions,
distorting research expenditures [Cohen and Noll 1991; Romer
1993]. For example, some argue that lobbying by defense contrac-
3. However, see Toole [1997] for an alternative view.




@xyserv2/disk4/CLS_jrnlkz/GRP_qjec/JOB_qjec113-4/DIV_031a07 jametors and AIDS activists has distorted the pattern of military and
medical research expenditures.
II. HISTORICAL EXPERIENCE OF PATENT BUYOUTS
During the early nineteenth century, when both patents and
prizes were used to to encourage invention, there were at least two
cases in which governments combined the patent and prize
systems by buying out patents. Such patent buyouts are attrac-
tive since they offer the opportunity to eliminate monopoly pricing
distortions and incentives for duplicate research, while raising
rewards for original research. It is worth exploring how they
functioned in practice.
In 1837 Louis Jacques Mande Daguerre invented photogra-
phy by developing the Daguerreotype process. He exhibited
images created using the process, and offered to sell detailed
instructions to a single buyer for 200,000 francs or to 100 to 400
subscribers at 1,000 francs each. Daguerre was not able to ﬁnd a
buyer, but obtained the backing of FrancoisArago, a politician and
member of the Academie des Sciences, who argued that it was
‘‘. . . indispensable that the government should compensate M.
Daguerre direct, and that France should then nobly give to the
whole world this discovery which could contribute so much to the
progress of art and science.’’5 In July 1839 the French government
purchased the patent in exchange for pensions of 6000 francs per
year to Daguerre, 4000 francs to his partner, and half that amount
to their widows upon their death. The French government then
put the rights to Daguerre’s patent in the public domain (except in
England, where the French government allowed Daguerre’s origi-
nal patent to remain in force). The invention was rapidly adopted
and subjected to technological improvements. Within months,
Daguerre’s instruction manual was translated into a dozen lan-
guages. Many complementary inventions improved the chemistry
and lenses used in Daguerre’s process.
In England, William Fox Talbot had developed the calotype
process independently, and when he heard of Daguerre’s process,
he patented his own system in 1841 [Nelson 1996]. The Daguerre
process became the standard, while the English process was
abandoned, perhaps in part because Talbot charged high fees for
use of his process. However, twenty years later a new process was
5. Cited in Nelson [1996].
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had Talbot’s process. The subsequent development of photography
followed this colloidotype process.
Like Daguerre, Eli Whitney was unable to make much money
from his patent [Green 1956]. The cotton gin could be easily
replicated by local carpenters and blacksmiths, and Southern
juries were creative in ﬁnding technicalities on which to rule
against Whitney in the many patent infringement suits that he
ﬁled. In 1802, facing bankruptcy, Whitney sold the South Carolina
rights to the cotton gin to the state government for $50,000, a tiny
fraction of the millions of dollars in surplus generated by the
invention. In 1803, on rather ﬂimsy pretexts, South Carolina
suspended payment on the unpaid balance of its debt to Whitney,
sued to recover the money Whitney had already been paid, and
even had him arrested. However, the legislature of 1804 reversed
the annulment of 1803. Later, Whitney sold the rights to the
cotton gin in North Carolina and Tennessee to the state govern-
ments in exchange for an agreement that the states would tax
cotton gins and pay the proceeds to Whitney.
Rewards have also been used in more modern times. The
United States Patent Compensation Board compensates develop-
ers of innovations of military value relating to atomic energy. The
former Soviet Union rewarded process innovators with a percent-
age of the cost savings created by their invention [Sinnot 1988]. It
is worth trying to draw a few lessons from the experience of the
cotton gin and Daguerreotype patent buyouts. In both cases the
government purchased important patents. The political economy
problem with patent buyouts does not seem to be that unscrupu-
lous rent-seekers bribe government officials to purchase patents
for useless inventions, but rather, as Whitney’s experience sug-
gests, that once a good is invented, governments may be tempted
to expropriate the inventor.
Both the Daguerreotype and the cotton gin were adopted
rapidly after the patents were bought out, and were subject to
further technological development afterward. Although we do not
have evidence on the counterfactual, it seems plausible that the
free availability of the inventions led to wider adoption, and that
this increased incentives and opportunity for the development of
technological improvements.
The Daguerreotype example indicates that buying patents
may increase inventors’ incentive to patent discoveries, rather
than relying on trade secrecy. The release of information on
PATENT BUYOUTS 1145
Page1145
@xyserv2/disk4/CLS_jrnlkz/GRP_qjec/JOB_qjec113-4/DIV_031a07 jameDaguerre’s techniques led to positive externalities for other
researchers,helpingcreatescientiﬁcadvancesinchemicalreactiv-
ity and solar spectrum analysis [Barger and White 1991].
A ﬁnal, cautionary, lesson is that buying out patents and
putting them in the public domain will reduce adoption of
substitute innovations which remain under patent. It seems
possible that the Daguerreotype process was too widely adopted
because it was free, whereas the Talbot process was costly. It is
unclear which process was superior, but it is possible that
selectively putting patents in the public domain could lead to the
adoption of inferior technology.
III. A MECHANISM FOR BUYING OUT PATENTS
A key problem in designing any system of patent buyouts is
developing a mechanism to determine the price at which patents
would be bought out. Ideally, the patent buyout price would be the
social value of the invention, since this would provide incentives
to invest in research only if the expected social beneﬁt exceeded
the cost.6
Scotchmer [1997] argues that patents are an optimal way of
rewarding research if the value of inventions is private informa-
tion of the researcher. While the value of potential inventions may
be private information of the researcher before research is con-
ducted, other ﬁrms in the industry are likely to have at least some
information on the private value of the invention after inventions
are patented. This paper explores one way to use this information
to determine a patent buyout price.
A standard way of eliciting information on the value of
indivisible goods, such as patents, is through auctions. Figure I
shows how an auction could be used to determine the price at
which the government would offer to buy out patents. Under the
mechanism, the market value of patents would be determined
through a sealed-bid second-price auction,7 and the government
would then offer to buy patents at this private value times some
constant markup which would reﬂect the typical ratio of social to
private value. Most of the patents that the government bought
would be placed in the public domain. However, in order to give
6. Many readers may think that this rule needs to be modiﬁed to take account
of the deadweight loss associated with taxation; for an argument that such
adjustment should not be made, see Kaplow [1996].
7. Sealing the bids may make collusion more difficult.
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small proportion of patents, chosen randomly, would be sold to the
high bidder. Patent holders would have the right to accept or
reject the government’s offer. Although the government might
require a waiting period following either patenting or FDA
approval of new drugs before it would buy out patents, patent
holders would be free to postpone patent buyouts. Inventors who
wished to sell their patents to the government would be respon-
sible for paying for the administrative costs of the auction.
Based on the empirical estimates of the social return to
innovation discussed above, it seems likely that the government
should offer to buy patents at a markup of at least twice their
estimated private value. This will not match the social value of
inventions, but it is likely to be a better approximation than the
private value of patents, which is what inventors receive in the
absence of patent buyouts.
Under a sealed-bid, second-price auction, auction partici-
pants will bid their expectation of the patent’s value, given their
information, conditional on their making the winning bid. It will
be efficient for the government to estimate the private value using
information from the entire distribution of bids, rather than only
the highest bid, since there is no reason to throw away the
information provided by the other bids. If the government knew
the prior distribution of valuations, it would be able to aggregate
FIGURE I
Auction Mechanism for Patent Buyouts
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patent. In practice, the government does not know the bidders’
prior distribution of valuations. Therefore, it might be best for the
government to use a simple rule, such as offering the original
patent holder some multiple of the third highest bid.8
The next sections consider the operation of the patent buyout
mechanism in several different environments: with inventor cost
or informational advantages; with complementary or substituting
inventions; and with the threat of collusion. As discussed in
Section VIII, this analysis suggests that pharmaceuticals may be
particularlywellsuitedtopatentbuyouts.However,beforeconsid-
ering these more complicated cases, it is worth ﬁrst reviewing the
advantages of patent buyouts in a perfectly competitive, collusion-
free environment.
1. The markup would raise private incentives for original
research closer to the social beneﬁt created by the
invention.
2. Deadweight losses due to monopoly pricing would be
eliminated if patents were put in the public domain.
3. Since monopoly proﬁts would be eliminated, researchers
would not have excessive incentives to invent substitutes
for existing drugs to steal proﬁts.
IV. INVENTOR COST OR INFORMATIONAL ADVANTAGES
If inventors have private information about the value of the
patent or are the low-cost producers of the patented good, they
will be more likely to reject the government’s offer to buy their
patents. This section argues, however, that unless these cost or
informational advantages are extreme, the markup will still lead
most inventors to sell their patents. In those cases in which
inventors do refuse to sell their patents, the system of patent
buyouts would be equivalent to the current patent system.
It is useful to consider two polar extremes of auction environ-
ments. Subsection IV.A examines the case of a common value
auction in which the original inventor is better informed about the
patent’s value than other bidders are. Subsection IV.B examines
8. Because this type of rule is robust to outliers, it makes the system less
prone to disruption by a few crazy bidders, or, as discussed in Section V, by
collusion. For example, if it were thought that the social value of inventions were
typically M times the private value, the private value was Y times the value of the
highest bid, and the highest bid was typically Z times the third highest bid, then
the government would offer MYZ times the third highest bid.
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highest value for the patent and there is some dispersion of
valuations among bidders.
IV.A. Inventor Informational Advantage
If the inventor has private information about the value of the
patent, the winner’s curse will lead bidders to make low bids
[Milgrom and Webber 1982; Hendricks and Porter 1988; Hen-
dricks, Porter, and Wilson 1994]. However, the winner’s curse may
be greatly mitigated by the markup.
Consider an example in which the patent has a common
value, the inventor knows this value, and conditional on the
information revealed by the FDAdrug approval process, potential
bidders know only that the value is distributed uniformly in
(L,U). The bidders will know that if a bid of B leads to the good
being sold by the inventor, then the true private value of the
patent is uniformly distributed in (L, min (U,MB)), where M is the
markup. In equilibrium, auction participants will bid the expected
value of the patent, conditional on their bid being accepted, or
(L 1 min (U,MB))/2. This implies that






The markup mitigates an adverse selection problem that could
otherwise shut down the market for patents. If M 5 1, so there
were no government markup, auction participants would bid L,
and patent owners would never sell their patents. For a markup of
2, auction participants will bid (L 1 U)/2, the government will
offer to buy out patents for L 1 U, and patents will always be sold.
This extreme result depends on the assumption that the
value of the patent is uniformly distributed. If the distribution of
the value of patents conditional on the information available to
bidders is skewed, then although adverse selection will be reduced
by the markup, it may not be eliminated. The unconditional
distribution of the realized value of FDA-approved drugs is
extremely skewed [Grabowski and Vernon 1990], but there is
likely to be much less variance and skewness in the distribution of
the expected value conditional on the information available to
bidders, including the number of people suffering from the
disease, the availability of competing drugs, and the efficacy and
side effects of the drug as revealed during the FDA approval
process. Moreover, a skewed distribution of realized values of
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about the expected value of the patent. After all, the skewness of
realized values of lottery tickets is extremely high, but there
would be only minor problems of asymmetric information in
selling lottery tickets. Note also that inventors will have an
incentive to reveal as much information as possible about the
invention, so as to reduce adverse selection in bidding. As a
referee has pointed out, asymmetric information about the value
of inventions makes sales of pharmaceutical patents by small
biotech ﬁrms to larger pharmaceutical ﬁrms complicated, and
sometimes blocks them entirely. Nonetheless, since such transac-
tions frequently take place currently without any government
markup, it seems likely that many patents would be sold in the
presence of a 100 percent markup.
IV.B. Inventors Who Are Low-Cost Producers
Inventors are often the low-cost producers of their inventions
because they own complementary assets, such as marketing
networks or unpatented intangible information on production
techniques. However, inventors will still typically sell their pat-
ents, because the government will offer a markup and because the
inventor will still be able to produce the good if the patent is
placed in the public domain.
To focus on the effect of differences in cost among potential
producers, suppose that the inventor can produce at a cost c0, that
the ith lowest cost producer can produce at cost ci, and that
demand for the good is given by Q 5 Pa, where a,2 1. For a
patent holder with cost ci, the optimal price is ci a/(a11), which
yields proﬁts of








Under a second-price sealed-bid auction, each auction partici-
pant will bid its valuation, pi. Suppose that the government offers
to buy out the patent at MZpj, where pj denotes the value of the
jth highest bid, Z is some multiplier, such as the historical ratio of
the jth highest bid to the highest bid, and M . 1 is the markup.
Inventors will sell their patents to the government if p0 , MZpj 1
(1 2 p)pCOMP, where p0 is the value to the inventor of a monopoly
on the good, p is the probability that patents purchased by the
government will be transferred to the high bidder, and pCOMP is
the value to the original inventor of producing the good in
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domain, and if c8/c ,a /(a11), so the inventor’s cost advantage is
not too large relative to the monopoly markup, then under
Bertrand competition, the inventor will limit price and obtain
proﬁts pCOMP 5 c1
a 1 (c1 2 c0).
Given the drastic markups in pharmaceuticals, and the ease
of manufacturing most pharmaceuticals, this condition for limit
pricing is likely to be fulﬁlled. However, if c1/c0 .a /(a11), so the
inventor’s cost advantage is drastic, and if the patent is placed in
the public domain, the inventor will sell the good at the monopoly
price, and obtain proﬁts p0. In this case, patent buyouts will not
ameliorate monopoly price distortions. This suggests that patent
buyouts are likely to be most desirable in industries in which
prices would be considerably lower in the absence of patents, such
as the pharmaceutical industry. Patent buyouts are also more
desirable in industries where cost differences are small, since they
would occasionally entail transferring the patent to higher-cost
producers. (As discussed in Section VII, patent buyers would not
be allowed to resell the patent to the original owner, because this
could facilitate collusion.)
To see why inventors will typically sell their patents, note
that if cj/c0 , (MZ)21/(11a), so the cost-advantage is not too great
relative to the markup, then Mzpj .p 0 . On the other hand, if
c1/c0 .a /(a11), inventors will sell the patent for sufficiently
small p, because their monopoly price will not be constrained by
competition, and hence p0 will equal pCOMP.
If potential bidders differ in their valuations, but must spend
some resources to learn their valuation, the costs of processing
information are likely to reduce entry into the auction, and hence
reduce the average winning bid in equilibrium. Presumably,
bidding costs will be smaller relative to the value of the patent for
more valuable patents, so bidding costs will be less likely to deter
bidding on pharmaceuticals which have already undergone FDA
approval, and thus are likely to be valuable.
Despite the markup, there will be cases in which asymmetric
infrastructure, cost advantages, or bidding costs lead bids to be so
low that the inventor will refuse to sell the patent. In such cases,
existing patent rules will remain in force, and (abstracting from
administrative costs) nothing will have been gained or lost by the
procedure. Since inventors who wish to sell their patents would be
responsible for covering the adminstrative costs of the auction,
they would not use the mechanism in those cases in which they
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Hence, the administrative costs of the auction would not be
incurred in those cases in which it is clear that the mechanism
would not succeed.
V. INCENTIVES FOR PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT
Incentives for marketing and development are likely to be
enhanced by patent buyouts. Suppose that the private value of a
patent is p(E), where E denotes expenditures on development and
marketing. In the absence of patent buyouts, patent owners will
invest in development until ­p/­E 5 1. Patent owners who expect
to sell their patent at a markup of M will invest until ­p/­E 5 1/M.
Inventors would be free to delay patent sales to ﬁrst undertake
development and marketing if they wished.
Some opportunities for further development may appear only
after patents have been sold. For example, technological advances
in related ﬁelds may open up new opportunities for development
after the patent has been bought out. Patent buyouts will
strengthen incentives for this further development if it can be
patented or appropriated in some other way. This is because the
market for a complementary invention will be larger if the
original invention is sold at marginal cost. Moreover, the devel-
oper of the complementary invention will not have to split its
value with the original inventor or take the risk that unresolved
patent disputes with the original inventor will block new comple-
mentary products.
Although patent buyouts increase inventors’ incentive to
conduct development prior to the buyout, and increase others’
incentives to conduct development after the buyout, they reduce
inventors’ incentives to conduct unpatentable development after
patent buyouts. For example, pharmaceutical ﬁrms have much
less incentive to test for new uses for generic drugs than for
patented drugs. In practice, there may be other ways of appropri-
ating investment in marketing and development. For example,
some aspirin manufacturers have sufficient market power that
even without patent protection they advertise aspirin’s effective-
ness in preventing heart attacks. The substantial technological
improvements to the Daguerreotype process and the cotton gin
after the patents were bought out provide at least some sugges-
tion that patent buyouts do not generally greatly discourage
further technological development. In any case, pharmaceuticals
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approved by the FDA.9
VI. SUBSTITUTE AND COMPLEMENTARY PATENTS
Anticipation that future substitute patents will be bought out
will reduce current research incentives in two ways.As subsection
VI.A shows, patent buyouts act as a subsidy to research, increas-
ing the chance that future substitutes will be developed quickly.
To attain the socially optimal level of research, the markup must
therefore be greater than the ratio of the social value of inventions
to their private value given the current level of research. Subsec-
tion VI.B shows that anticipated buyouts of substitute patents
also deter current research by causing future patents to be placed
in the public domain, and thus to be more formidable competitors.
In order to preserve incentives for current research, patent
buyouts would incorporate a rule that if a patent remains in
private hands and a substitute patent is put up for auction, the
holder of the original patent could have it jointly randomized with
the new patent. Either both patents would be placed in the public
domain, or both patents would be transferred to their respective
high bidders. Complementary patents would also be jointly ran-
domized, as discussed in subsection VI.C.
VI. A. Patent Buyouts as Research Subsidies
The expectation that future patent buyouts will encourage
research on substitutes will partially offset the tendency for the
markup to spur research. The optimal markup will therefore be
greater than the current ratio of the social value of inventions to
their private value. To see this, consider models of creative
destruction such as Aghion and Howitt [1992] or Grossman and
Helpman [1991], in which each invention is eventually subject to
competition from future inventions. Under these models, research
at time t, xt, can be written as xt 5f ( M t , x t 1 1 ), where Mt is the
subsidy to research at time t, f1 . 0, and f2 , 0. Suppose that
there is a constant markup M. Denote the research effort that
would be chosen by a social planner as xs. I assume that xs is
9. If complete patent buyouts prevented development, the mechanism could
be modiﬁed to allow some market power in newly invented goods. For example, the
government could offer to buy out the last ten years of a patent after it had been in
private hands for seven years. Alternatively, rather than placing patents in the
public domain, the government could sell a limited number of licenses to produce
the good, converting what would have been a monopoly into an oligopoly.
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patent buyouts.10 The optimal markup Ms solves xs 5f( M s , x s ).
The optimal markup will be the typical ratio of the social value of
inventions to their private value, given that the socially optimal
amount of research will be conducted in the future. Ms is greater
than the markup needed to induce research xs given the expecta-
tion that future patents will not be bought out, Mp, since Mp solves
xs 5f( M p,x p). To see the intuition, note that the expected lifetime
of patents, and hence their private value, will be lower if more
research is expected in the future. Hence the ratio of social to
private value under patent buyouts will be greater than the ratio
of social to private value without patent buyouts. This implies
that the optimal markup is even larger than the ﬁgure of 2 to 3.33
suggested by Section II.
VI.B. Joint Randomization for Substitute Patents
Patent buyouts at time t 1 1 may reduce incentives for
research at time t not only by encouraging research at time t 1 1,
but also by causing inventions at time t 1 1 to be placed in the
public domain and sold at marginal cost, and thus to be more
formidable competitors for inventions developed at time t.11 As
explained below, incentives for current research can be preserved
by holding a joint randomization to determine whether substitute
patents would each be put into the public domain, or each be
transferred to their respective high bidders.
To see why anticipated patent buyouts with separate random-
ization could weaken current research incentives, note that bids
for a new patent would be reduced by the likelihood that future
substitutes will be put in the public domain. For example, people
would bid less for the patent on Prozac if they expected that the
patent on Zoloft would be put in the public domain. (This point is
shown formally in a working paper version of this paper [Kremer
1998].)
Joint randomization could preserve incentives for current
research. It would work as follows: if the patent on one invention
was in private hands, and a substitute was invented and put up
for auction, the holder of the original patent could ask for it to be
10. Although equilibrium research effort may be either greater or less than
optimal in models of creative destruction, the empirical evidence suggests that the
current patent system produces too little research and development [Jones and
Williams 1995].
11. This effect does not arise in the Aghion and Howitt model because they
assume that all inventions are drastic.
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tive buyers would bid on each patent separately, but the govern-
ment would conduct a single randomization to determine whether
the original and substitute patents would be put in the public
domain or whether each would be sold to the high bidder in its
auction.12
Note that joint randomization does not require a bureaucracy
to judge whether goods are substitutes. Any patent holder could
claim that his or her patent was a substitute for a new patent, and
request that it be jointly randomized with the new patent. Even if
the new patent was not in fact a substitute for the old patent,
jointly randomizing the old patent together with an unrelated
new patent would create no harm and would have the advantage
of possibly transferring another patent to the public domain.
Under joint randomization, each patent will be valued based
on the contingency in which both it and a possible future
substitute stay in private hands, as shown in Kremer [1997]. Joint
randomization or reversion to the existing patent system would
occur only if the original patent remained in private hands.
Presumably, these cases would be rare, because most patents
would be sold to the government and placed in the public domain.
The analysis above assumes that demand for the original
invention is affected only by the contemporaneous price of the
substitute, not the expected future price. This assumption seems
appropriate for nondurable goods—that is, goods which are
destroyed when they are consumed, such as most pharmaceuti-
cals. However, as discussed in Kremer [1997], demand for du-
rable, nonrentable goods will be reduced by anticipated buyouts of
future substitute patents, even under joint randomization. Patent
buyouts along the lines discussed in this paper may therefore be
less appropriate for such patents.
VI.C. Joint Randomization for Complementary Patents
Whereas anticipation that substitute patents will be put in
the public domain reduces the price at which patents are bought
out, anticipation that complementary patents will be bought out
increases the buyout price. Under separate patent buyouts,
inventors are paid the marginal value of their inventions, condi-
12. If the original inventor had not previously sold the original patent to the
government, then the government would pay a markup on the original patent, but
if the original had been through a previous patent buyout, the government would
not pay a second markup.
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sum of these marginal values may be greater than the total value
of a set of complementary inventions.
To see this in a simple case, consider an example in which two
complementary inventions each have private value 0.1p individu-
ally but have value p together, and suppose that the social value of
the patents alone or together is twice their private value. If one
patent is put in the public domain, then the reward for invention
of the other patent will be 0.9p times the markup. This implies
that under separate patent buyouts the developers of each patent
can expect to receive approximately 0.9p times the markup, since
bidders for the ﬁrst patent will anticipate that the second patent
is likely to be put in the public domain and by the time the second
patent has been invented, the ﬁrst patent will probably be in the
public domain. This will create excessive incentives for creation of
the pair of inventions, since the social value of the pair is only 2p.
(It would also create an incentive for inventors to divide up
inventions into multiple complementary patents.)
To reduce the possibility that the government pays more than
the social value of complementary patents, and to avoid creating
incentives for inventors to split up inventions into multiple
patents, the government should not separately purchase comple-
mentary patents. Patent owners who do not wish to sell jointly
would not have to sell their patents, but they would not be eligible
for future, separate patent buyouts. Inventors who sell one patent
to the government would not be eligible to sell future complemen-
tary patents to the government until after a waiting period
elapsed.
If a set of drugs were complementary, the government would
offer to buy out the set together, and if the offer were refused, the
government would then offer to buy out only a (randomly selected)
single member of the set.Amarkup of two suffices to ensure that a
single owner of an arbitrary number of complementary patents
will always prefer to sell all the patents to the government, rather
than to sell one patent and retain the others.13
If complementary patents were held by different owners, the
government would solicit bids both on those patents belonging to
13. To see this, note that the patent owner will receive Mp in exchange for a
set of patents which are worth p together and zero alone. The owner would receive
a maximum of Mp/2 in exchange for all but one of the patents. The remaining
patent will be worth p with probability 1 2 p and a maximum of p/2 with
probability p. The owner will therefore prefer to sell all the patents as long as
Mp.M p /2 1 (1 2 p)p1p p /2, or equivalently, if 2 2 p , M.
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owners could not agree to a joint sale, the government would offer
to buy the patents controlled by one owner picked randomly, with
probability proportional to the estimated value of its patents.
The government could determine whether the patents were
very strong complements by looking at the pattern of bids. If a set
of patents are complements, the sum of the bids for subsets will be
less than the bids for the entire set (assuming that the bidders
anticipate they will not perfectly cooperate in pricing the goods
after buying out the patents). If the government mistakenly
classiﬁed patents as complements and refused to buy out each
patent separately, patent owners would not be harmed if they
agreed to sell jointly, and even if they could not agree to sell jointly,
they would still be better off than under the current patent
system, as long as at least one member of the set of complemen-
tary patents was put in the public domain.
One of the advantages of buying out patents for pharmaceuti-
cals is that complementary patents are considerably less common
in pharmaceuticals than in other industries. Whereas in many
ﬁelds, inventions are typically protected by several patents,
pharmaceuticals are much more often protected by a single
patent.14 This is in part because a new drug is often a particular
molecule, and in part because the FDA approval process is so
expensive that it does not make sense to break a drug into two
separate drugs, each of which have to be approved separately. Of
course, some drugs are complements. For example, a chemother-
apy drug may create side effects, and another drug may alleviate
those side effects.
VII. PREVENTING COLLUSION
The auction mechanism is potentially vulnerable to collusion,
since patent holders would have an incentive to bribe auction
participants to bid high. The bidder would only have to pay the
government with probability p. However, with 100 percent prob-
ability, the patent holder would receive an inﬂated payment. It is
impossible to eliminate collusion, but, as subsection VII.A ex-
plains, a variety of mechanisms could be used to minimize
14. Sometimes a new drug will be protected both by a product patent and by
process patents on techniques manufacturing. The government could refuse to buy
process patents separately, and only agree to buy product patents when sold
together with any associated process patents.
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government for patents could be limited by ceiling prices based on
actual sales of the patented pharmaceutical.
VII.A. Mechanisms for Preventing Collusion
The government could make collusion more difficult using
standard procedures such as requiring bids to be sealed, punish-
ing companies and individuals found guilty of collusion, and
rewarding whistle-blowers. This would make collusion more
difficult and more dangerous. Several additional methods speciﬁc
to patent buyouts could also be used.
1. The government would base the price it offers the inventor
on the third highest bid. The original patent holder would
therefore have to bribe three companies instead of one to
ensure a substantial increase in the buyout price. This
should signiﬁcantly increase both the difficulty of collusion
and the chance of detection.
2. The agency purchasing patents could have authority to
call the bluff of suspected overbidders by reducing the
markup and selling to the high bidder without randomiza-
tion in a set percentage of cases. For example, suppose
that based on the other bids, and any knowledge of the
industry, the government’s best estimate of the patent’s
value was p. If a bidder offered p1xand the government
suspected collusion,15 the government could offer to buy
out the patent at p1$1, and then require the suspected
colluding bidder to purchase the patent at its bid of p1x.
The government would make a proﬁt of x 2 1 from the
attempted collusion.
3. The government could develop lists of suspect bidders by
checking whether winning bidders made money, since
systematic overbidders would incur big losses.
4. To prevent inventors from forming front companies and
having them submit high bids, bidders would have to
provide information on any ties they had with the inven-
tor. Bidders who lied about ﬁnancial ties with the inventor
would be subject to prosecution.
5. Bidders could be required to pay a licensing fee or deposit
allowing them to participate in a number of auctions. This
15. Collusion could be indicated by an abnormally high variance of bids; entry
of companies that had not participated in the past; or high bids by suspected
colluders relative to those from a known group of ‘‘honest’’bidders.
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dummy companies simply to bid on their own patents.
Excluding bidders will be costly if there are only a few
potential bidders, but there will often be many potential
bidders, because it is straightforward to manufacture
most drugs, as evidenced by the fact that there are often
many different producers of generic drugs. (For example,
fourteen ﬁrms produce oral albuterol sulfate.) Any system
of patent buyouts that relies on auctioning patents should
focus on drugs that are easy to produce, rather than those
which require complicated manufacturing facilities.
6. To prevent inventors from developing a reputation for
buying back their patents at inﬂated prices, inventors
would be prohibited from buying back the patent from the
winning bidder, or making other payments to bidders.
Preventing these side payments might be one of the most
difficult aspects of preventing collusion.
At least in the early years of any program of patent buyouts,
thegovernmentagencyadministeringtheprogramwouldpresum-
ably have a budget for patent buyouts, and would not be able to
afford all the patents that were available for purchase. One option
would be to allow the agency to choose which patents to purchase,
so that if the price for a particular patent was too high, it could
decline to purchase the patent and cancel the randomization. This
would tend to reduce collusion because raising the patent buyout
price would reduce the chance that the patent would be bought
out.
VII.B. Ceiling Prices
Because patent sales are voluntary, the private value of the
patent acts as a ﬂoor on the patent buyout price. If the mecha-
nisms for limiting collusion discussed in the previous subsection
were thought inadequate, there are several ways that govern-
ments could establish ceiling prices, and thus reduce the risk of
paying vastly inﬂated sums for patents.
1. A waiting period of several years could be required before
patents were bought by the government, and ceiling prices
could be set as a multiple of annual revenues prior to the
patent buyout. A waiting period would also make it easier
for bidders to assess the value of patents, and would
further guarantee that inventors would have incentives
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prices as a multiple of prebuyout revenue would lead ﬁrms
to artiﬁcially boost sales, for example by offering hospitals
discounts on other drugs in exchange for purchasing the
patented drug, or even by paying outright kickbacks. Tied
sales would have to be prohibited.Asecond ceiling could be
established based on the prebuyout price times postbuyout
consumption.
2. The amount paid for patents could be capped by total sales
of the drug following the patent buyout, times an adminis-
trative estimate of the social value of the drug per dose or
perpatient.Internationalestimatesofthecostindisability-
adjusted life years of various diseases are already avail-
able. These could be combined with information on drug
effectiveness from FDA trials to estimate a ceiling price
per dose. Setting these ceilings requires administrative
discretion, but the associated rent-seeking may be limited
by the fact that setting a ceiling only requires a fairly
transparent decision about the social value of the drug per
dose. Public interest groups could monitor attempts to set
outrageous prices per dose more easily than they can
monitor whether the NIH is subsidizing pure science in
the guise of developing an AIDS vaccine or whether
national laboratories and breeder reactors are being cre-
ated for pork barrel or scientiﬁc reasons. The historical
record suggests that the political economy problem in
setting patent buyout prices is more that governments
have an incentive to expropriate inventors ex post than
that inventors wrangle huge sums for unimportant
products.
3. It also might be worth considering a mechanism like that
in Figure II, with a ceiling price based on the actual proﬁts
obtained from the new drug. Inventors who wished to
participate would have their patents randomized. The
patent would be randomized to the high bidder with some
probability p, and placed in the public domain with
probability 1 2 p. Inventors would be paid only if the
patent was randomized to the high bidder. In this case,
they would receive (M/p) min(bid,p), where M is the
markup, bid is the estimated value of the patent based on
the bids, and p is the realized revenue (or ideally proﬁts)
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inventor is thus M min (bid,p).16
Inventors could try to manipulate the ceiling price by
bribingthehighbiddertoboostsalesartiﬁcallythroughtie-ins
with other products. The government would have to monitor
bidders carefully to minimize such tie-ins. While tie-ins will
cost the government money, they will not necessarily reduce
efficiency, since by increasing sales they may counteract the
static distortions created by monopoly pricing. The majority of
patents would be put in the public domain so the issue would
not arise, and in any case, it is likely to be difficult for ﬁrms to
greatly increase demand artiﬁcially for drugs covering serious
sharply deﬁned diseases, such as cystic ﬁbrosis.
It is easy to dream up scenarios under which people could
evade rules designed to discourage collusion, but it is also
importanttorememberthatmanyinstitutionswhicharetheoreti-
cally vulnerable to collusion operate relatively well. For example,
peer-review is highly vulnerable to collusion, yet the National
Science Foundation and the National Institutes of Health seem
relatively effective. Moreover, limited collusion is not necessarily
that harmful. Collusion itself is not a problem; deadweight losses
16. This mechanism does not require the inventor to bear nearly so much risk
as it may seem at ﬁrst glance. Inventors should be able to insure themselves at
rates which are close to actuarially fair against the possibility that the patent will
be randomized to the high bidder, since this probability is objective and known to
all (unlike the value of patents, about which inventors may have private
information). Inventors would sign contracts under which they would receive $x in
every state of the world, and pay $x/p if their patents were sold to the high bidder.
Risk-averse inventors would like to buy enough insurance to receive ME[min
(bid,p)] in every state of the world, where the expectation is taken conditional on
the inventors’information.
FIGURE II
Patent Buyouts with Ceiling Prices
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that these deadweight losses would exceed the deadweight losses
due to insufficient original research, monopoly-price distortions,
and the diversion of effort to ‘‘me too’’ research in the absence of
patent buyouts. Even if collusion raises patent prices above their
social value, the social value of inventions may be approximated
better by the collusive price than by the existing patent system,
under which private incentives for developing new inventions are
likely to be less than half the social value of the inventions.
Finally, if implicit collusion were expected to signiﬁcantly raise
patent prices, then the markup over the private value could be
reduced accordingly. For example, if the optimal markup was
three (as seems plausible), and if collusion were thought to raise
prices by up to 50 percent, then the government could simply offer
a markup of two.
The auction mechanism described in this paper may be
appropriate for many pharmaceuticals, but it would not be
appropriate in industries where markets are too thin for auctions,
or patents are not an effective means of protecting inventions. In
such industries the government could simply offer to buy out
patents for an amount equal to postbuyout sales times an
administratively determined estimate of the average consumer
surplus per unit of the good consumed.
VIII. CONCLUSION:T RIAL PATENT BUYOUTS
Previous sections have examined the potential of patent
buyouts to supplement our current system of promoting innova-
tions through patents and direct government support of research.
The government could offer to buy out patents at their private
value, as revealed by an auction, times a markup designed to
cover the difference between the private and social values of
inventions. This mechanism involves more government discretion
than the current patent system, but substantially less discretion
than government funding of research through the NSF or NIH.
Patent buyouts could potentially increase incentives for original
invention closer to their social value; reduce incentives for waste-
ful ‘‘me too’’research; and eliminate monopoly pricing distortions.
On the other hand, patent buyouts could also cause a number of
problems, including collusion to raise buyout prices.
When new institutions are proposed, there is a natural
tendency to focus on their potential risks and shortcomings.
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nisms of encouraging innovation have serious ﬂaws. In an 1851
editorial (cited by Dutton [1984]) urging that patents be abol-
ished, The Economist wrote that the granting of patents ‘‘inﬂames
cupidity, excites fraud, stimulates men to run after schemes . . .
begets disputes and quarrels betwixt inventors, provokes endless
lawsuits [and] makes men ruin themselves for the sake of getting
the privilege of a patent, . . .’’All this is true, and yet it seems clear
that the world is much better off with patents than without them.
The same may be true for patent buyouts.
Since it is difficult to gauge the effects of patent buyouts based
on theory alone, and since large-scale patent buyouts would be
risky, it might be useful to ﬁrst try patent buyouts on a limited
basis. Such a trial could help determine whether inventors would
sell their patents, and whether bids would be substantially
greater than realized proﬁts or revenues, as would be the case if
collusion were severe. This would help policy makers judge
whether patent buyouts should be abandoned, redesigned, or used
more widely.
Pharmaceuticals are a natural area to try patent buyouts,
since markets would be relatively competitive in the absence of
patents; patent protection is effective; monopoly markups are
large; drugs are nondurable; ‘‘me too’’ inventions are widespread;
and considerable information is generated during FDA trials, so
potential bidders could make informed bids.17 Moreover, because
many pharmaceutical patents are valuable, the administrative
costs of the system are likely to be small relative to the beneﬁts of
patent buyouts. Once FDA approval has been granted, little new
development is typically required.
Finally, buying out pharmaceutical patents is likely to have
benign distributional consequences, whereas buying out, say,
patents for improved yachts will not. Financing pharmaceutical
research through patents places the ﬁnancing burden on disease
victims. If disease incidence is random, and not fully insurable,
people will prefer ex ante to insure themselves by funding the
research out of general tax revenue.
The system could initially be applied to treatments for a few
speciﬁc diseases considered to be particularly important, or
17. Distortions in the market for health care may actually strengthen the
case for buying out pharmaceutical patents. Although people may consume too
much health care due to subsidies, subsidies for pharmaceuticals are generally
smaller than for alternative, more expensive, treatments, such as surgery, so
pharmaceutical subsidies maybe desirable on second-best grounds.
PATENT BUYOUTS 1163
Page1163
@xyserv2/disk4/CLS_jrnlkz/GRP_qjec/JOB_qjec113-4/DIV_031a07 jameparticularly subject to problems resulting from the patent system.
Orphan drug legislation provides a precedent for establishing
special rules for drugs designed to treat particular diseases.
A private foundation could conduct an initial trial of patent
buyouts. If the experience of the foundation patent buyout was
positive, the government could consider appropriating, say, $100
million from general revenue or from the NIH budget for patent
buyouts.
One precedent for innovative philanthropic support of re-
search is the million dollar prize established by the Rockefeller
Foundation for invention of a diagnostic test for gonorrhea and
chlamydia suitable for use in developing countries. The social
value of such a diagnostic test is likely to far exceed the private
value, since gonorrhea and chlamydia are believed to increase the
likelihood of HIV transmission three-to-ﬁve fold [Rockefeller
Foundation 1997]. Although gonorrhea and chlamydia are easily
treated, millions of people go untreated because diagnostic tests
suitable for use in developing countries are not available. The
prospect of patents does not seem to have encouraged sufficient
research on diagnostic tests, and in any case, monopoly pricing of
such diagnostic tests might dramatically reduce the number of
people tested and treated, spurring the spread of HIV.
Ashortcoming of prizes, including the Rockefeller Foundation
prize, is that they do not allow for trade-offs among various
performance criteria. To be eligible for the Rockefeller Foundation
prize, diagnostic tests must be 99 percent accurate, take less than
twenty minutes, require no more power than can be delivered by a
nine-volt battery, be storable for six months in tropical conditions,
cost less than U. S. $0.25 per device to manufacture, and be usable
by health workers with only primary education after two hours of
training [Rockefeller Foundation 1997]. Ideally, the speciﬁcations
would be much more ﬂexible, since it is possible that it would be
very hard to design a test that would exactly meet the Rockefeller
Foundation’s speciﬁcations, but easy to create a test that was
slightly less accurate, but much cheaper, faster, and simpler to
use.
PerhapstheRockefellerFoundationshouldconsiderannounc-
ing that if the prize has not been claimed by the date the offer
expires (March 1, 1999), it would consider using the funds to buy
out a patent on a diagnostic test that does not completely fulﬁll
the prize criteria. The foundation might want to buy only part of
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For example, the foundation might buy out the last ten years of
the patent. In such an auction, the auction participants would bid
for the full rights to the patent, and with probability 1 2 p the
foundation would offer to buy out the last ten years of the patent
for its estimated full value, and with probability p the foundation
would buy out the patent fully, at twice its estimated full value,
and then sell the patent rights to the highest bidder at the second
highest bid.
This paper has examined the use of auctions to determine
patent buyout prices, but the general approach to limiting govern-
ment discretion through public auctions may be more widely
applicable. Optimal mechanism design often requires decisions
tailored either to individuals, or to small numbers of agents.
However, government rules typically restrict the use of some
types of information. For example, civil service rules limit discre-
tion over pay and promotion decisions. Similarly, there are
extensive rules restricting what types of evidence are admissible
in trials, even though other information could shift priors. This
paper has considered a system that allows governments to tailor
decisions to individuals without allowing unlimited government
discretion over small numbers of people. To induce people to
reveal the information needed by the government, an auction is
held in which bidders need only be awarded the item with a small
probability. I am currently exploring whether a similar mecha-
nism can be used to determine a price at which taxpayers would
be allowed to purchase exemption from distortionary taxation.
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